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When different legal controversies arise, parties frequently employ alter-
native dispute resolution procedures to resolve them. Yet some members of
ethnic minority groups and women may seek judicial proceedings out of a
concern that their ethnicity or gender may undermine their ability to
achieve beneficial bargaining outcomes through ADR. This article ad-
dresses the real and perceived challenges of ethnic minorities and women in
ADR. It draws upon decades of research into dispute resolution bargaining
processes to illustrate that most traits associated with ethnicity and gender
are irrelevant today with respect to ADR. When persons are taught even
minimally about the bargaining process and how it operates, such informa-
tion greatly enhances their likelihood of interacting effectively. Well-pre-
pared minorities and women should thus be able to seek advantageous
terms for themselves in ADR, even when dealing with white-male counter-
parts. Conversely, there is no guarantee that members of ethnic groups or
women would achieve more advantageous outcomes in judicial proceed-
ings. Even the formal rules of judicial proceedings may be influenced by
subconscious stereotypes that still influence the ways that judges, jurors,
and arbitrators assess litigant situations. Therefore, this article posits that
adjudication is not clearly preferable to ADR procedures for minority
group members and women.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN the late 1970s and early 1980s, individuals began to encourage thecreation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to re-solve legal controversies.1 I found this development quite interesting
since I had already obtained a Master’s Degree in Collective Bargaining
and Labor Law. I had also been teaching a course on collective bargain-
ing and labor arbitration and became a coauthor of the third edition of
the Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration book.2 In my studies, my
teaching, and my work on this book, we explored the use of negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration to resolve employment disputes. We read A
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,3 which described how labor
and management representatives should employ integrative bargaining
techniques to effectively and efficiently resolve controversies. This seem-
ingly innovative approach to negotiating was developed in the early part
of the last century by a business consultant named Mary Parker Follett.4
To enable them to generate mutually efficient bargaining agreements,
labor and management representatives must go behind their stated posi-
tions and explore each side’s underlying interests. Which terms do union
leaders desire that are not significant to employers (e.g., a union security
clause), and which items do management officials value that are not that
important to bargaining unit members (e.g., a no-strike provision)? By
ensuring that these terms end up on the appropriate side of the bargain-
ing table, labor and management negotiators can generate the largest
joint surplus and ensure the attainment of optimal accords.5 With respect
to the terms valued by both sides (e.g., wages and fringe benefits)—the
so-called “distributive” items—bargainers are likely to employ more
competitive tactics to enable them to claim a greater share of the surplus
for their own side.6
1. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982);
Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May–June 1983, at 38.
2. DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD, LEROY S. MERRIFIELD & CHARLES B. CRAVER, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION (3rd ed. 1988).
3. RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LA-
BOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965).
4. See generally JOAN C. TONN, MARY P. FOLLETT: CREATING DEMOCRACY, TRANS-
FORMING MANAGEMENT 266–71 (2003).
5. See WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 3, at 52–53.
6. See id. at 11–125.
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In the collective bargaining course, we not only explored the way in
which persons negotiate but also the way mediation can be used to help
parties achieve accords. We considered what the labor and management
representatives should be doing and what neutral facilitators do during
joint bargaining sessions and separate caucus sessions conducted by the
mediator with each party alone. Almost all collective bargaining agree-
ments contain grievance arbitration procedures that the parties use to re-
solve contractual issues that arise during the life of existing agreements.
During the early stages of these procedures, employer and employee rep-
resentatives meet and endeavor to resolve these contractual disputes
through conventional negotiation. In the relatively few instances in which
they are unable to achieve mutual resolutions, union officials can request
arbitration. The parties select a certified neutral who is empowered to
conduct formal hearings that will culminate in binding determinations.
We also considered the use of interest arbitration procedures to resolve
controversies over future bargaining agreements parties have been una-
ble to achieve on their own. Although some private sector bargaining
agreements provide for such interest arbitration procedures, most do not,
and disputing parties have traditionally resorted to work stoppages to
help them achieve their desired results. A number of public sector labor
statutes that prohibit work stoppages by government employees provide
for resort to interest arbitration procedures when collective bargaining
efforts do not achieve mutual accords.
When Getting to Yes7 was first published in 1981, it was considered a
highly innovative approach to negotiating, which emphasized the benefits
to be derived from integrative bargaining designed to maximize the joint
returns achieved by parties. I was surprised to discover how many of the
concepts described by Fisher and Ury pertaining to generic negotiating
had earlier been articulated by Walton and McKersie with respect to col-
lective bargaining interactions. This made me appreciate the fact that the
new ADR movement was really an extension of what labor and manage-
ment representatives had been doing for many decades. They resolved
most disputes through traditional bargaining. When they were unable to
achieve accords on their own, they enlisted mediator assistance to facili-
tate their discussions, and when they were still unable to reach agree-
ments, they frequently resorted to binding arbitration.
II. POTENTIAL RISK OF PREJUDICE IN ADR PROCEDURES
When Richard Delgado coauthored his seminal article on Fairness and
Formality in 1985,8 he discussed the use of negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration to resolve many civil, and even criminal, matters and the con-
cern that such dispute resolution procedures might prejudice minority
7. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
8. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
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and female participants. He explored the perceived safeguards associated
with formal and public judicial proceedings and compared them to pri-
vate, informal ADR procedures. He talked about how formal rules of
evidence and professional adjudicators would minimize the impact of po-
tential biases.9 He expressed the view that “ADR decisionmakers or
other third parties are rarely professional, and there is rarely a decision-
making body similar to a jury.”10
In the next section of his article, Professor Delgado explored different
theories for prejudice.11 He noted that:
highly prejudiced persons tend to have an “authoritarian personal-
ity,” characterized by rigidity, conventionality, difficulty in accepting
impulses they consider deviant (for example fear, weakness, aggres-
sion and sex) as part of the self, a tendency to externalize these im-
pulses by projecting them on others, and a need for status and power
in personal relationships.12
He further suggested that “[b]ecause ethnic minorities possess charac-
teristics that seem different from those of the dominant group, they be-
come ready targets for rejection and displaced hostility.”13 He went on to
note socioeconomic differences resulting from slavery and segregation
and suggested that “[s]capegoating of racial minorities is especially easy
because many of them are visibly poor.”14 Professor Delgado also ex-
plored social–psychological theories of prejudice, which generally emerge
in early childhood as children develop an awareness of skin color and its
social significance.15
Professor Delgado then explored ways in which persons affected by
prejudice resolve inner conflicts in different ways.16 They may repress
their concerns, rationalize them, or compromise their true interests.
These tendencies could significantly influence the way minorities and wo-
men participate in ADR procedures. When such persons become in-
volved with formal litigation, they benefit greatly from the fact that our
judicial system “has incorporated societal norms of fairness and even-
handedness into institutional expectations and rules of proce-
dure.”17Professor Delgado talked about the fact that minority children
become aware of their societal differences early in life, especially with
respect to their different skin color.18 They begin to experience different
treatment, which can trigger different responses—avoidance, aggression,
or acceptance. Since these factors may cause many victims of discrimina-
tion to respond with apathy or defeatism, their favored forum to redress
9. See id. at 1373–75.
10. See id. at 1374.
11. See id. at 1375–83.
12. Id. at 1376.
13. Id. at 1377.
14. Id. at 1379.
15. See id. at 1380–83.
16. See id. at 1384–85.
17. Id. at 1387–88.
18. See id. at 1390.
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such wrongs has traditionally been the formal adjudicatory setting.19 On
the other hand, individuals who feel they are the masters of their fate and
think they can thus control their own destinies are more likely to resort to
ADR type procedures to resolve difficulties they encounter.
Professor Delgado noted that the dispute resolution process favors per-
sons from higher socioeconomic classes who believe they can exert con-
trol over their outcomes but often induces persons from lower orders “to
sacrifice their grievances in the interests of peace and cooperation.”20
“By creating an environment that emphasizes cooperation and imposing
that on the disputants, ADR denies the existence of many conflicts and
transforms others into simple misunderstandings.”21 He emphasized the
fact that formal legal procedures begin with a presumption of inequality
between disputing parties and establish formal rules to protect the inter-
ests of weaker parties, while informal dispute resolution procedures pre-
sume that participating groups are relatively equal in political power,
wealth, and social status.22
Professor Delgado explored an article by Professor Owen Fiss entitled
Against Settlement23 to support his opposition to the use of ADR proce-
dures by traditionally disadvantaged group members.
An imbalance of power can distort the settlement process in a num-
ber of ways: (1) The poorer party will be less able than the wealthier
party to predict the outcome of litigation and thus will be in an infer-
ior bargaining position; (2) the poorer party may be in great need of
damages and thus willing to settle for a smaller sum rather than wait
for a larger recovery through litigation; and (3) the poorer party may
be forced to settle simply because she cannot afford to hire counsel
or finance litigation, regardless of the merits of her claim.24
He also cited Fiss with respect to the view that disputants in settlement
proceedings may encounter conflicts of interest with their legal represent-
atives due to the fact that in negotiations the advocates shape the settle-
ment terms, while in adjudications the results are determined by neutral
judges and juries.25 In addition, he noted the claim by Fiss that while
settlements may generate peace between the immediate parties, they may
fail to further the interests of similarly situated parties not directly in-
volved in the current disputes.26
Professor Delgado concluded his article by noting that “ADR increases
the risk of prejudice toward vulnerable disputants . . . [while] the rules
and structures of formal justice tend to suppress bias.”27 He emphasized
19. See id. at 1390–91.
20. See id. at 1392.
21. Id. at 1393.
22. Id. at 1394.
23. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
24. Delgado et al., supra note 8, at 1398 (footnotes omitted) (citing Fiss, supra note 23,
at 1076).
25. See id. (citing Fiss, supra note 23, at 1080).
26. See id. at 1399 (citing Fiss, supra note 23, at 1085).
27. See id. at 1400.
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his belief that ADR procedures are most likely “to incorporate prejudice
when a person of low status and power confronts a person or institution
of high status and power.”28 This is due to the fact that individuals of low
status are less likely to assert their claims energetically when they negoti-
ate with parties from higher status. In addition, these dangers may in-
crease when neutral facilitators become involved if such mediators are
members of the superior group or class. He thus suggested that ADR
procedures should only be employed with respect to disputes involving
parties of comparable power and stress.
III. IMPACT OF RACE AND GENDER ON
NEGOTIATION RESULTS
For forty years, I have been teaching courses on legal negotiation to
several thousand law students and to over 95,000 practicing attorneys in
continuing legal education programs. When I first began to conduct in-
house programs at major law firms, senior partners occasionally asked me
whether I thought women and minority students could negotiate as effec-
tively as white males. I was concerned about such inquiries due to the fact
that I also teach employment discrimination law.29 Partners harboring
such perspectives might be hesitant to hire or promote women and mi-
nority members due to their thoughts that such persons might not be able
to advocate for their clients as persuasively as white males. I thus decided
to conduct some empirical studies to determine whether I would find any
differences in the results achieved by female or minority students on my
legal negotiation course exercises.
A. LEGAL NEGOTIATION COURSE METHODOLOGY
In the early 1960s, innovative law professors began to appreciate the
fact that practical exercises could be employed to teach students the ne-
gotiation skills they would use throughout their careers. Professors James
White,30 Cornelius Peck, and Robert Fletcher31 developed simulation
models designed to enhance the bargaining proficiency of future legal
practitioners. Their students explored the negotiation process and worked
on a series of exercises designed to demonstrate the different concepts
being taught.
My regular three credit hour legal negotiation course is based upon the
White/Peck/Fletcher models. I assign students readings in my Effective
28. See id. at 1402.
29. See ARTHUR B. SMITH, JR., CHARLES B. CRAVER & RONALD TURNER, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2016).
30. See generally James J. White, The Lawyer as a Negotiator: An Adventure in Under-
standing and Teaching the Art of Negotiation, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337 (1967); see also
HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR: PROBLEMS,
READINGS AND MATERIALS (1977).
31. See Cornelius J. Peck & Robert L. Fletcher, A Course on the Subject of Negotia-
tion, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 196 (1968); see also CORNELIUS J. PECK, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON NEGOTIATION (2d ed. 1980).
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Legal Negotiation and Settlement book.32 The class explores the impact of
different negotiator styles.33 In the “win-win” cooperative/problem-solv-
ing approach, where the participants move psychologically toward each
other, participants seek to maximize the joint returns and are open, trust-
ing, and reasonable with each other. In the “win-lose” competitive/adver-
sarial approach, where the individuals move psychologically away from
each other, participants endeavor to maximize their own returns and are
less open, less trusting, and manipulative. In the hybrid “WIN-win” com-
petitive/problem-solving approach, where the negotiators seek to maxi-
mize their own returns, participants are not entirely open or cooperative
and are somewhat manipulative, but endeavor to maximize the results
achieved by their counterparts once they have obtained what they want
for themselves.34 Members of the latter group tend to achieve the best
results for their clients because they recognize the critical nature of the
bargaining process.35 Studies have found that when individuals think the
negotiation process has been fair and feel they have been treated respect-
fully, they are actually more satisfied with objectively less beneficial
terms than when they feel the process has not been fair.36
The class then focuses on the six stages of the bargaining process to
demonstrate how structured such interactions are.37 During the “Prepara-
tion Stage,” negotiators must ascertain the relevant factual, legal, eco-
nomic, and cultural issues and then determine their own bottom lines,
their own goals, and their planned opening positions. They must also try
to place themselves in the shoes of their counterparts and estimate the
goals and bottom lines of those parties. They begin their interaction with
counterparts during the “Preliminary Stage,” where they seek to establish
rapport with the people on the other side and create positive bargaining
environments that are most likely to generate cooperative and efficient
interactions.
During the “Information Stage,” which is “value creation,” the negotia-
tors endeavor to determine the pertinent issues to be addressed and the
32. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (8th
ed. 2016) [hereinafter CRAVER, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT]. Over the past fifteen
years, I have also taught a one credit hour legal negotiation course in which students read
my book, CHARLES B. CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUES: LEGAL NEGOTIATING (3d ed. 2016)
[hereinafter CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUES], and work on a number of negotiation exercises.
Grades in this course are entirely pass/fail.
33. See CRAVER, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 32, at 11–18.
34. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES B. CRAVER, LEGAL NEGOTIATING 53–54
(2007).
35. See Keith G. Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for
Managing the Dilemma Between Creating and Claiming Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387, 394–95
(2000); see also Charles B. Craver, The Inherent Tension Between Value Creation and Value
Claiming During Bargaining Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 101, 107–08
(2010).
36. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
381 (2010); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. IN-
QUIRY 473 (2008).
37. See CRAVER, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 32, at 55–162.
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underlying interests associated with those terms. The optimal way to ob-
tain the relevant information is to ask many questions designed to induce
counterparts to talk and reveal their interests. Once they complete the
Information Stage, negotiators move into the “Distributive Stage,” which
is “value claiming.” During this portion of the process, the participants
have to divide the surplus they created during the Information Stage. This
is a highly competitive part of most legal interactions. Near the end of the
Distributive Stage, the negotiators begin to see the likelihood of an
agreement on the horizon, and they enter the “Closing Stage.” By this
time, the participants have become psychologically committed to an
agreement, but they must still move carefully to avoid making greater
position changes than their counterparts.
Once negotiators agree upon binding terms, they frequently think their
interactions are over. Individuals who make this mistake often end up
with less efficient terms than they might have achieved had they moved
into the “Integrative Stage,” which is “value maximizing.” The parties
should look for items that may have ended up on the wrong side of the
bargaining table due to the fact that the parties have over- and under-
stated the value of items during the previous stages for strategic purposes.
They should work to see if they might be able to exchange some terms
that will simultaneously advance the interests of both sides.
During subsequent classes, we examine the different negotiating tech-
niques individuals are likely to employ, the importance of looking for ver-
bal leaks and nonverbal signals, factors such as telephone and e-mail
interactions, and negotiation ethics. We also focus on cultural differences
pertaining to such factors as nationality, ethnicity, and gender. They ini-
tially work on a series of practice exercises designed to demonstrate the
concepts being covered, which will allow them to experiment regarding
the way in which they interact with others. They then work on five differ-
ent exercises, the results of which are rank-ordered from high to low, with
the results of these exercises accounting for half of their course grade.
The other half of their grade is based upon ten to fifteen page papers they
write describing what they learned during the semester.
B. REAL AND PERCEIVED RACE AND GENDER ISSUES
1. Impact of Race
Negotiations involving participants from diverse ethnic backgrounds
frequently develop differently than bargaining interactions involving per-
sons from similar backgrounds. People tend to negotiate more coopera-
tively with counterparts of the same race and culture than with persons of
different races and cultures.38 Similarity apparently induces trust and
reduces the need for each interactor to maintain a particular “face” in
their counterpart’s eyes. Individuals from different ethnic backgrounds
38. See JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BAR-
GAINING AND NEGOTIATION 163 (1975).
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bring certain stereotypical baggage into their new interactions.39 It is
amazing how many common characteristics—positive, negative, and neu-
tral—are attributed by many people to all persons of a particular race.40
When people who harbor such stereotypical beliefs initially encounter in-
dividuals from other races, they tend to attribute their stereotypical
preconceptions to those persons, and this phenomenon may influence the
preliminary portion of their interactions.
Students I have taught at different law schools over the past forty years
have often allowed their stereotypical beliefs to influence their bargaining
interactions. Many of my students—regardless of their ethnicity—think
that white males are the most Machiavellian, competitive negotiators.
They expect those men to employ adversarial and manipulative tactics to
obtain optimal results for themselves. On the other hand, many expect
black, Hispanic, and Asian negotiators to be more accommodating and
less competitive.
Despite the unreliability of many stereotypical beliefs, several empiri-
cal studies have found a few relevant differences between black and white
interactants. Blacks tend to be high in terms of Interpersonal Orientation
(IO).41 High IO individuals are more sensitive and responsive to the in-
terpersonal aspects of their relationships with others.42 This tendency
should make blacks more effective negotiators. During verbal en-
counters, blacks tend to speak more forcefully and with greater verbal
aggressiveness than whites.43 In competitive settings, this trait might en-
hance the bargaining effectiveness of individuals with these traits, while
in cooperative settings it might undermine their ability to achieve mutual
accords. When they interact with others, blacks tend to make less eye
contact while listening to others than do whites,44 which might undermine
their ability to establish beneficial rapport with others and to read non-
verbal signals.
Another factor which might influence minority bargainers concerns
what is characterized as “stereotype threat.”45 When individuals from dif-
ferent minority groups are told that persons from their background do
not generally perform as well as whites with respect to particular tasks,
they tend to do less well, even though members of their groups who are
not given such biased information do as well as their white counterparts.
39. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Sports Agents, Role Models and Race-Consciousness, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 267, 277 (1996); James G. Sammataro, Comment, Business and Broth-
erhood, Can They Coincide? A Search into Why Black Athletes Do Not Hire Black Agents,
42 HOW. L.J. 535, 555 (1999).
40. See ANDREA L. RICH, INTERRACIAL COMMUNICATION 51–62 (1974).
41. See RUBIN & BROWN, supra note 38, at 164.
42. See id. at 158.
43. See Martin N. Davidson & Leonard Greenhalgh, The Role of Emotion in Negotia-
tion: The Impact of Anger and Race, in 7 RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
3, 22 (R. Bies, R.J. Lewicki & B.H. Sheppard eds., 1999).
44. See ROBERT G. HARPER, ARTHUR N. WIENS & JOSEPH D. MATARAZZO, NONVER-
BAL COMMUNICATION: THE STATE OF THE ART 188 (1978).
45. See generally STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION
(Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012).
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If minority participants were led to believe that they would not achieve
negotiation results as beneficial as their white cohorts, they might be neg-
atively influenced by this factor and not do as well on bargaining
exercises.
Following the publication of an article by James Sammataro indicating
a reluctance of black athletes to hire black agents, I performed a study of
the results achieved by black and white students on negotiation exercises
in my class and found no statistically significant differences with respect
to the average results achieved or the standard deviations involved.46
These results would strongly suggest that formal training eliminates nego-
tiation result differences based upon the race of the participants.
2. Impact of Gender
Just as racial stereotypes can influence the way in which some persons
interact with people of different races, gender-based stereotypes can have
a similar impact. Men—and even many women—often expect women to
behave like “ladies.” Aggressiveness that would be considered assertive
advocacy if employed by men may be characterized negatively when em-
ployed by women.47 Male negotiators who would normally counter ag-
gressive tactics by other men with similar responses might find it difficult
to do so when dealing with females. Men who behave this way could pro-
vide female counterparts with an inherent bargaining advantage. Male
negotiators occasionally endeavor to obtain a psychological advantage
against competitive female bargainers by casting aspersions on their femi-
ninity. Female negotiators should not permit counterparts to employ this
approach since they have the right to employ any style they think appro-
priate, regardless of any gender-based stereotypes they may contradict.
Empirical studies have found that male and female subjects do not be-
have identically in overtly competitive situations. Females tend to be ini-
tially more trusting and trustworthy than their male cohorts, but they are
less willing than males to forgive violations of their trust.48 Individuals
interacting with female cohorts who behave in seemingly open and coop-
erative ways may be able to establish trusting and cooperative relation-
ships with those persons, so long as they do not commit transgressions.
Males, on the other hand, are less likely to focus on such relationship
issues, and they are more likely to establish elevated goals to enable them
to obtain more beneficial results when they interact with female
46. See Charles B. Craver, Race and Negotiation Performance, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Fall 2001 at 22, 25–26.
47. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT: HOW WOMEN CAN USE
THE POWER OF NEGOTIATION TO GET WHAT THEY REALLY WANT 256–58 (2008) [herein-
after BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT].
48. See LEE E. MILLER & JESSICA MILLER, A WOMAN’S GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL NE-
GOTIATING: HOW TO CONVINCE, COLLABORATE, & CREATE YOUR WAY TO AGREEMENT
42–45 (2002); RUBIN & BROWN, supra note 38, at 171–73.
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counterparts.49
One negotiation observer has suggested that “women are more likely
[than men] to avoid competitive situations, less likely to acknowledge
competitive wishes, and not likely to do as well in competition.”50 Many
women are apprehensive with respect to the negative consequences they
associate with competitive achievement, fearing that competitive success
will alienate them from others.51 Males tend to exude greater confidence
than females in performance-oriented situations.52 Even when minimally
prepared, males think they can “wing it” and get through such situations
successfully, while thoroughly prepared females tend to feel unpre-
pared.53 This factor may explain why men like to negotiate more than
women54 and why they tend to seek more advantageous results than their
female cohorts.55 Males tend to feel more comfortable in risk-taking situ-
ations than women.56 When males bargain, they are inclined to use more
forceful language and exhibit more dominant nonverbal signals than
females.57
Women tend to seek and achieve less beneficial results than men when
they negotiate for themselves, but they usually set higher goals and ob-
tain more advantageous results when they bargain on behalf of others.58
During personal interactions, men are more likely to employ “highly in-
tensive language” to persuade others, while women are more likely to
employ less intensive language.59 On the other hand, women tend to be
more sensitive than men to verbal leaks and nonverbal signals.60 None-
theless, when individuals receive specific training, male–female communi-
49. See Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social
Cognitive Analysis, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 203, 205 (Leigh L. Thomp-
son ed., 2006).
50. Irene P. Stiver, Work Inhibitions in Women: Clinical Considerations 7 (Wellesley
Ctrs. for Women, Wellesley College, 1983); see LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER,
WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 102–03 (2003) [hereinafter
BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK].
51. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT, supra note 47, at 32.
52. See Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Gender Differences in Competition, 24
NEGOT. J. 447, 450–56 (2008).
53. See GAIL EVANS, PLAY LIKE A MAN, WIN LIKE A WOMAN: WHAT MEN KNOW
ABOUT SUCCESS THAT WOMEN NEED TO LEARN 84–85, 90–91 (2000); Peggy McIntosh,
Feeling Like a Fraud 1, 2 (Wellesley Ctrs. for Women, Wellesley College, 1985).
54. See Deborah A. Small, Michele Gelfand, Linda Babcock & Hilary Gettman, Who
Goes to the Bargaining Table? The Influence of Gender and Framing on the Initiation of
Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 600 (2007).
55. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT, supra note 47, at 146–47.
56. See id. at 32.
57. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK, supra note 50, at 105.
58. See Emily T. Amanatullah & Michael W. Morris, Negotiating Gender Roles: Gen-
der Differences in Assertive Negotiating Are Mediated by Women’s Fear of Backlash and
Attenuated When Negotiating on Behalf of Others, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
256, 258 (2010).
59. See Michael Burgoon, James P. Dillard & Noel E. Ooran, Friendly or Unfriendly
Persuasion: The Effects of Violations of Expectations by Males and Females, 10 HUM.
COMM. RES. 283, 284, 293 (1983).
60. See ALLAN PEASE & BARBARA PEASE, THE DEFINITIVE BOOK OF BODY LAN-
GAUGE: THE HIDDEN MEANING BEHIND PEOPLE’S GESTURES AND EXPRESSIONS 13–14
(2006).
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cation differences tend to disappear.61
Men tend to define themselves by their individual achievements, while
women tend to define themselves by their relationships and group en-
deavors.62 In competitive bargaining situations, particularly zero-sum in-
teractions, participants possessing such male traits could reasonably be
expected to outperform participants possessing stereotypically female
traits.63 Another factor that could influence male and female bargaining
interactions concerns the fact that men and women differ with respect to
what they consider to be appropriate outcomes. Women tend to value
“equal” exchanges, while men tend to desire “equitable” outcomes.64
These different predispositions might cause female bargainers to accept
equal results even when they possess greater economic power than their
counterparts, while male negotiators would strive for equitable exchanges
that would reflect power imbalances.
When men and women interact in non-intimate settings, men tend to
speak for longer periods of time and interrupt conversations more fre-
quently than women.65 This masculine tendency to dominate
male–female interactions can provide men with an advantage during bar-
gaining interactions by enabling them to control the discussions. Men also
tend to be more direct than women. If a man is hungry, he is likely to say
so directly and indicate a desire for food. On the other hand, women tend
to be more indirect. If a woman is hungry, she is likely to ask the individ-
uals around her if they are hungry, hoping they will appreciate the fact
she wants something to eat.66 This factor might similarly cause men to be
perceived as more forceful than women at the bargaining table.
When men and women prevaricate, they tend to have different objec-
tives. Males frequently lie on a self-oriented basis to enhance their own
reputations (braggadocio), while females tend to engage in other-ori-
ented lying intended to make other people feel better (“I love your new
outfit”).67 This difference would most likely cause males to feel more
comfortable than their female cohorts when they engage in deceptive be-
61. See Nancy A. Burrell, William A. Donohue & Mike Allen, Gender-Based Percep-
tual Biases in Mediation, 15 COMM. RES. 447, 453 (1988).
62. See Deborah M. Kolb & Linda L. Putnam, Negotiation Through a Gender Lens, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 135, 137 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C.
Bordone eds., 2005).
63. See Laura J. Kray, Leigh Thompson & Adam Galinsky, Battle of the Sexes: Gender
Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 942, 946 (2001).
64. See Catherine Eckel, Angela C.M. de Oliveira & Philip J. Grossman, Gender and
Negotiation in the Small: Are Women (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative than Men?, 24
NEGOT. J. 429, 441 (2008).
65. See KAY DEAUX, THE BEHAVIOR OF WOMEN AND MEN 60 (1976).
66. See DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT’S NOT WHAT I MEANT! HOW CONVERSATIONAL
STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS 71–73 (1986); Lynn Smith-
Lovin & Dawn T. Robinson, Gender and Conversational Dynamics, in GENDER, INTERAC-
TION, AND INEQUALITY 122, 124–26 (Cecilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1992).
67. See Bella M. DePaulo, Deborah A. Kashy, Susan E. Kirkendol, Melissa M. Wyer
& Jennifer A. Epstein, Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 979,
986–87 (1996).
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havior during negotiation encounters to advance their own interests,
since such conduct would be of a self-oriented nature. Would such deceit-
ful conduct be unethical?
When lawyers negotiate, they frequently engage in overt deception.
For example, Side A may be authorized to accept any amount over
$100,000, while Side B may be authorized to pay up to $130,000, which
provides the participants with a $30,000 settlement range. Once the small
talk concludes and the participants begin to focus on the real issues, the
Side A representative might say that he could not accept less than
$160,000, while the Side B representative might indicate that she cannot
pay more than $70,000. They are both pleased that they have been able to
commence the substantive talks successfully, but they have both lied
about their true settlement intentions. Have they committed an ethical
violation? Model Rule 4.1 is a paragon of clarity. It states that “a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person.”68 When this rule was being drafted, persons who teach ne-
gotiation emphasized the fact that during bargaining interactions almost
all lawyers over- or under-state their positions for strategic purposes.
They induced the American Bar Association (ABA) to add Comment 2,
which states:
Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types
of statements ordinarily are not to be taken as statements of material
fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transac-
tion and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim
are ordinarily in this category.69
Although I agree that negotiators regularly misrepresent their underly-
ing values and settlement intentions, since this is an inherent aspect of
bargaining interactions,70 I must confess that these are the only truly ma-
terial elements of such endeavors. The factual, legal, and economic issues
are all secondary. What the parties must determine is which items are
valued by the other side and how much they must concede to get those
counterparts to accept a deal. Nonetheless, due to the “puffing” and “em-
bellishment” indigenous to such interactions, I do not expect counter-
parts to be completely open with respect to these issues.
When one considers these gender-based differences, should they ex-
pect male and female negotiators to achieve statistically different results?
Professor Kay Deaux noted many years ago that behavioral predictions
based upon such stereotypical beliefs are likely to be of highly questiona-
ble validity in most situations.71 There are relatively few characteristics in
which men and women consistently differ. Men and women both seem to
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
70. See generally Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions, 25
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 299 (2010).
71. See DEAUX, supra note 65, at 144.
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be capable of being aggressive and helpful and, alternatively, cooperative
and competitive.
Over the past two decades, I performed several empirical studies com-
paring the results achieved by male and female students on my graded
course exercises. I consistently found no statistically significant differ-
ences with respect to the average results achieved or the standard devia-
tions involved.72 These studies would suggest that despite some
behavioral differences between men and women, those differences do not
significantly affect the bargaining outcomes they achieve.
During the fall semester of 2015, I decided to perform a slightly differ-
ent statistical assessment. I initially examined the student results on the
first practice exercise to see if there might be any gender-based differ-
ence, and I found that the average male placement results were higher
than average female placement results, with a level of statistical signifi-
cance at the 0.0276 level.73 This was consistent with the differences found
by Professors Korobkin and Doherty in a study they had conducted
among first year law students working on a single bargaining exercise.74 I
thought that with careful training gender-based differences would disap-
pear, as they had in my prior studies. I was thus surprised when I com-
pared the male and female results on the graded exercises conducted
during the second half of the semester. The male placement means were
78.559 while the female placement means were 61.643, with these differ-
ences statistically significant at the 0.002 level.75
In the final class of the semester, I disclosed these findings and asked
the students what might have contributed to these different results. A
number of students suggested that some males and a few females had
behaved in an aggressive and even adversarial manner to advance their
interests, causing more female counterparts to give in than male counter-
parts. Some female students also indicated that their fear of nonsettle-
ments caused them to give in near the end of their interactions to avoid
the consequences associated with such “failures.”
During the fall 2016 semester, I focused on the concerns the students
had addressed at the end of the 2015 term. We explored ways in which
students could effectively counter aggressive and adversarial tactics.76 I
emphasized the fact that when nonsettlements resulted, both sides ob-
tained low exercise scores. I indicated that when counterparts threaten
72. See Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 341 (1999); Charles B. Craver, The Impact of
Gender on Clinical Negotiating Achievement, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 12–16
(1990); Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Gender on Negotiation Performance, 14 CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 339, 354–56 (2013).
73. See Charles B. Craver, Formal Training Does Not Always Eliminate Gender-Based
Negotiation Differences, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 15 (2016).
74. See Russell Korobkin & Joseph Doherty, Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations? 11
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 162, 189–92 (2009).
75. See Craver, supra note 73, at 17.
76. See generally WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT
PEOPLE (1991).
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nonsettlements, all students—especially females—should ask themselves
whether they truly believe their counterparts would be satisfied with such
results. They should thus suggest that they will not give in to such threats.
At the conclusion of the 2016 term, I compared the average placement
scores achieved by the forty-seven male and female students on the
graded exercises. The male mean was 68.4 and the female mean was
66.96, with a p-value of 0.8087, indicating a complete absence of statistical
significance. In future years, I will again emphasize the ways in which
students can effectively deal with aggressive tactics and the fact that no
rational students want to end up with nonsettlements. I am confident that
this approach will continue to eliminate any gender-based differences.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADR PROCEEDINGS
A. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON BARGAINING INTERACTIONS
When individuals work to establish new professional relationships or
change existing relationships, they should negotiate. They should simi-
larly negotiate when difficulties arise. These may be between managers
and subordinates at work or between business partners, friends or neigh-
bors, or even immediate family members. Persons who feel uncomforta-
ble negotiating will place themselves at a distinct disadvantage, because
they will either have to accept what their counterparts are proposing or
walk away. If minority members or women were to place themselves in
these positions by declining to interact, they would be unlikely to obtain
arrangements as beneficial as those obtained by white male cohorts will-
ing to bargain.
When I make presentations on negotiating to female groups, I tell them
they should contemplate “out-of-body experiences” when they have to
negotiate agreements for themselves. Many women are uncomfortable
negotiating with others, and when they bargain for themselves they tend
to set lower goals than their male cohorts. I strongly encourage them to
assume that a close friend has asked them to represent her and work to
obtain beneficial outcomes for that person. They should act as if a friend
with their resume has asked them for such assistance and work to achieve
the objectives they would try to obtain for that individual. If they behave
in this manner, they can significantly diminish the likelihood they will
accept terms less beneficial than they should be able to obtain.
When persons are taught even minimally about the bargaining process
and how it operates, this should greatly enhance the likelihood they will
interact in this manner and do so effectively. If women or minorities are
having problems with their spouses, children, or other family members,
they should endeavor to deal directly with those individuals. If they are
unable to resolve such matters in this manner, they may contemplate
marital dissolutions. By this time, they usually seek legal assistance.
People involved with neighborhood controversies or difficulties with
municipal regulators must initially communicate directly with the rele-
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vant persons to see if they can agree upon mutually acceptable arrange-
ments. In the vast majority of cases, they are able to do so, and they are
pleased to have done so amicably. When such interactions do not work
out, they often seek legal assistance.
When individuals apply for jobs, they may suspect they are not being
considered seriously due to their race or gender. They may even suspect
such discriminatory treatment from their current employers. They may be
denied promotions, given smaller pay increases, or subjected to racial or
sexual harassment not controlled properly by their employers. In such
circumstances, they might contact the employer’s equal employment op-
portunity officials, a state fair employment practice agency, or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
Individuals encountering such difficulties are extremely likely to re-
solve them through informal or formal interactions with the pertinent
parties. They will get together and express their concerns and work to
achieve mutually acceptable resolutions. In most cases, they will do so
successfully.
Despite the concern of Professor Fiss that these matters may concern
issues of significant interest to other people or groups, they generally do
not. They usually pertain to isolated matters that do not have such exter-
nal ramifications. As a result, their amicable resolution of such matters
through relatively confidential bargaining interactions does not under-
mine the rights of others. In the unusual situations where group interests
are involved, they may seek the assistance of such entities as the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), or a wo-
men’s rights group.
Most attorneys who deal with family matters, property rights, employ-
ment issues, and similar arrangements are used to resolving the underly-
ing issues through bargaining interactions. Most are taken care of without
the need to initiate formal legal proceedings. They contact the relevant
persons on the other side and endeavor to work with them to generate
acceptable results. Even where formal proceedings are commenced, very
few ever go to trial. The overwhelming majority of such legal matters are
settled through inter-party negotiations. This saves disputing parties sig-
nificant monetary amounts and enables them to avoid the psychological
traumas so frequently associated with formal litigation. It may also enable
them to address emotional issues that courts cannot usually resolve. For
example, someone may want to obtain a sincere apology from the person
responsible for their plight.
It is generally irrelevant whether the clients are minority or nonmi-
nority group members or are male or female. Their legal representatives
will diligently seek to advance their interests, as they are ethically obliged
to do under Model Rule 1.3. It is also irrelevant in most situations
whether their attorneys are minority or nonminority persons, or are men
or women, due to the fact that most lawyers have a fairly good idea how
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to negotiate—even if they have had minimal formal training in this area.
They have generally been conducting such interactions on a regular basis
and have learned how to do so effectively.
B. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON MEDIATOR ASSISTED INTERACTIONS
When inter-party negotiations are unable to generate mutually accept-
able results, conflicting parties often seek the assistance of neutral
facilitators. Such mediators work with the interested individuals to help
them with their negotiations. The styles employed by mediators can be
important due to the fact that different approaches might adversely affect
the parties involved because of their ethnicity or gender.
Effective mediators generally possess a number of common character-
istics.77 They tend to be objective persons who are aware of their own
potential biases. They have excellent communication skills and are em-
pathetic listeners and assertive speakers. They are active listeners who are
adept readers of nonverbal signals. They generally have good interper-
sonal skills that enable them to interact well with persons from diverse
backgrounds. They understand the negotiation process and the way in
which they can enhance bargaining interactions. Since they lack the au-
thority to impose actual terms on bargaining parties, they must rely on
their powers of persuasion and their reputations for impartiality and fair-
ness to help parties achieve mutual accords.
Mediators tend to primarily employ one of three different styles.78
Most are facilitative intervenors who work to reopen blocked communica-
tion channels and encourage direct inter-party negotiations. Some em-
ploy an evaluative style and focus primarily on the substantive terms
being discussed. They often suggest the terms they think the parties
should agree upon. “An innovative group of mediators are
[t]ransformative.”79 They endeavor to empower weak participants and
generate mutual respect that will enhance the ability of disputing parties
to resolve their difficulties.
Facilitative mediators work to regenerate party-to-party discussions to
enable the bargaining participants to structure their own deals.80 They
think that temporary impasses are caused by communication breakdowns
and/or unrealistic expectations. They strive to reopen communication
channels and induce the negotiators to re-evaluate the reasonableness of
their respective positions. They ask many questions designed to prompt
the participants to reconsider their positions and to encourage the parties
to explore new areas. They prefer to conduct joint sessions during which
77. See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MEDIATION: A DEALMAKER’S DISTINC-
TIVE APPROACH TO RESOLVING DOLLAR DISPUTES AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS
57–65 (2012).
78. See DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: A
VIDEO-INTEGRATED TEXT 63–92 (2d ed. 2012).
79. CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUE, supra note 32.
80. See MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, EXAMPLES & EXPLA-
NATIONS: DISPUTE RESOLUTION 85–86 (2d ed. 2011).
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the parties engage in face-to-face bargaining. They rarely resort to sepa-
rate caucus sessions with each side, except when they encounter serious
difficulties during which the disputing parties are unable to talk directly
with one another in a conciliatory manner.81 They also consider separate
caucus sessions when they think that one side is behaving in an adver-
sarial manner designed to intimidate their counterparts. This enables
them to minimize the possibility that one party can employ intimidating
techniques to take advantage of timid counterparts.
Communication between facilitative mediators and negotiating parties
is designed to re-establish meaningful and constructive inter-party discus-
sions. They ask questions to induce participants to reassess their own po-
sitions and to think more openly about the positions being articulated by
their counterparts. They almost never offer their own evaluations di-
rectly, but they accomplish this result through the questioning process.
Facilitative mediators are especially appreciated by proficient negotiators
who desire minimal bargaining assistance and wish to control their own
outcomes.
Evaluative mediators are frequently used to assist relatively inexperi-
enced negotiators who have difficulty achieving their own agreements.82
These mediators usually deal with individuals who either do not know
how to initiate meaningful bargaining interactions or are unable to ex-
plore the relevant issues in a manner likely to generate mutual accords.
As a result, they feel the need to control the situations they encounter.
Evaluative mediators can also help even skilled negotiators overcome
seemingly irreconcilable issues blocking ongoing interactions.83
Evaluative mediators like to use separate caucus sessions during which
they explore the underlying interests of each party outside the presence
of the persons on the other side. This approach minimizes the possibility
that adversarial parties can directly intimidate weaker counterparts. Eval-
uative mediators initially ask many questions designed to let them know
what each side needs to achieve. Once they feel they have a sound under-
standing of the relevant terms, they formulate packages they believe will
optimally serve the interests of everyone. They then employ a direct ap-
proach to let each side appreciate the terms they believe everyone should
accept. When participants object to suggestions being made, these neu-
trals try to convince those persons that the proposed accord would be the
best they could hope to achieve.
Negotiators who are uncertain regarding the appropriate way for them
to achieve mutually acceptable agreements and who desire substantive
guidance from experienced neutrals may appreciate the assistance pro-
vided by evaluative mediators. They should carefully select substantive
experts who are likely to understand their particular interests and work
with them to generate terms that best satisfy the objectives of both sides.
81. See DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 46–47 (1983).
82. See MOFFITT & SCHNEIDER, supra note 80, at 86–87.
83. See generally FREUND, supra note 77.
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Since these neutral facilitators generally conduct separate caucus ses-
sions, it is difficult for competitive negotiators to employ adversarial tac-
tics designed to intimidate their counterparts.
In their thoughtful 1994 book, Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger
explored a novel approach to mediation.84 They rejected the traditional
facilitative and evaluative mediation styles in favor of a more relation-
ship-oriented approach designed to transform disputing parties into rela-
tively self-sufficient problem solvers. They believe that many persons
have difficulty negotiating with others because they feel they have no
meaningful power to influence the bargaining outcomes. Individuals may
also find it difficult to appreciate the underlying interests of the persons
with whom they are dealing.
Transformative mediators strive to empower weak-feeling parties by
demonstrating the rights and external options available to those persons
through settlement and nonsettlement alternatives. They also help the
participants understand the positions being taken by their counterparts
and recognize—even if they do not accept—the validity of those posi-
tions. They believe that empowered individuals who are aware of their
nonsettlement alternatives and appreciate the perspectives of their coun-
terparts can optimally work to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. This
approach is especially beneficial where family disputes are involved and
one or both parties feel emotionally or economically impotent. It can also
be effective where employment controversies arise and the affected
workers feel they possess no bargaining power vis-a`-vis their employers.
Unlike facilitative and evaluative mediators who are particularly inter-
ested in achieving resolutions of the underlying disputes, transformative
conciliators are primarily interested in future party relationships. They
may be pleased when their efforts generate current agreements, but they
prefer to help disputants understand how they can effectively resolve
their own future controversies. To accomplish this objective, transforma-
tive intervenors focus on two basic issues: party empowerment and inter-
party recognition.85
Many women and minority group members feel a lack of bargaining
power when they interact with others due to the discriminatory practices
that have historically affected their groups. As a result, they understanda-
bly fear that mediators may undervalue their interests and favor the posi-
tions being articulated by white males, especially those from upper
socioeconomic groups. For people experiencing such concerns, transform-
ative mediation can be especially helpful. They need the assistance of
someone who will help them understand two critical factors. First, they do
not have to reach agreements. If the positions being set forth by their
84. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (1994); see also ROBERT A. BARUCH
BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE AP-
PROACH TO CONFLICT (rev. ed. 2005) (responding to assessments of their first edition).
85. See BUSH & FOLGER (1994), supra note 84, at 20–21.
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counterparts are particularly disadvantageous, they may be better off
seeking judicial assistance through the litigation process—or by terminat-
ing current relationships with the parties on the other side. Second, they
can also benefit from an appreciation of their counterparts’ underlying
interests.
When transformative mediators are not available, it can be helpful to
look for facilitative mediators who will try to get the parties working to-
gether to resolve their differences. When skilled facilitative neutrals rec-
ognize that one or both sides feel impotent, they generally endeavor to
show them that they do have realistic options they could choose instead
of caving into unreasonable counterpart demands. Such neutrals are also
good at controlling the bargaining environment to prevent adversarial
persons from rudely and aggressively intimidating parties short on self-
confidence. This can be particularly critical where someone feels such im-
potence due to their race or sex.
Parties who understandably fear that dispute resolution procedures
would be likely to disadvantage them because of their race or sex may
feel uncomfortable dealing with evaluative mediators. If they lack the in-
ner confidence of their white male counterparts, they might think such
mediators will try to impose terms favoring the persons on the other side.
Proficient neutrals should appreciate such concerns, work hard to assist
such persons to understand their true bargaining power, and assist them
with the articulation of appropriate positions their counterparts must
consider.
The biggest thing women and ethnic minorities must appreciate is the
fact that they do not have to give in to the demands of others. They must
carefully consider their nonsettlement options and understand that bad
deals are worse than no deals when they would be better off going to
court or doing business with someone else. They must also strive to place
themselves in the shoes of the persons on the other side to appreciate the
degree to which those parties need what they can provide. If such persons
really need to generate mutual accords to further their own interests, they
would be unlikely to let the current discussions culminate in nonsettle-
ments. As soon as they appreciate that the individuals on this side would
be willing to accept their nonsettlement alternatives, those counterparts
would be likely to become more open to fair terms.
Recent studies have found no significant differences with respect to the
results achieved by female and minority claimants compared with white
males with respect to mediated matters.86 These findings are important,
especially with respect to persons with limited financial means. If such
individuals are unable to resolve their controversies through negotiation
and mediation, they may lack the financial resources needed to proceed
86. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gen-
der on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 767, 777 (1996); Sharon Press, Court-Connected Mediation and Minorities: A Report
Card, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 819, 829 (2011).
2017] Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Disadvantage? 911
to litigation.87
C. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON JUDICIAL OR ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
On those relatively rare occasions when disputing parties are unable to
achieve agreements through the bargaining process, even with mediator
assistance, they can frequently resort to formal adjudicatory proceedings.
In some instances, their contractual relationships may require them to
submit their disputes to arbitration; if not, they can generally go to court.
Although many people think that formal procedural rules can help to
diminish the impact of possible prejudice against women and minority
persons, it is not always clear that this assumption is correct. Although it
is true that the overt forms of discrimination that affected many women
and ethnic minorities in the past have significantly decreased as we have
moved into the modern world and understand how improper such consid-
erations are, it is important to understand how even subconscious biases
may come into play.88
Judges, arbitrators, and jurors often possess stereotypical beliefs they
are not even aware of. They may have implicit beliefs regarding women
and different ethnic groups that might influence how they evaluate posi-
tions being articulated by members of different groups. When they en-
deavor to evaluate the merits of positions put forth before them, they
may subconsciously give greater respect to members of one group vis-a`-
vis members of other groups. It should thus be clear that no matter how
much formal adjudicatory rules attempt to minimize the impact of such
biases, they cannot eliminate them entirely. This is a major reason women
and minority group members should not automatically dismiss reliance
on the negotiation process and the assistance of neutral facilitators to re-
solve their controversies. During these procedures, they have the ability
to directly influence both the processes involved and the results, if any,
achieved. They can work hard to diminish the possible impact of subtle
biases that might undermine their persuasiveness and endeavor to control
the final outcomes that may be achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
When different legal controversies arise, parties frequently employ al-
ternative dispute resolution procedures to resolve them. They initially try
to negotiate with the other persons involved. If they encounter bargaining
difficulties, they may request mediator assistance. Members of ethnic mi-
nority groups and women may be concerned that their ethnicity or gender
may undermine their ability to achieve beneficial results through the bar-
gaining process, even with mediator assistance. Although there continue
87. See Press, supra note 86, at 838.
88. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmak-
ing and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006).
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to be some different traits associated with ethnicity and gender, most are
irrelevant today with respect to ADR proceedings. Well prepared minori-
ties and women should be able to seek good terms for themselves, even
when dealing with white male counterparts. Even though judicial pro-
ceedings may have formal rules designed to minimize potential racial or
gender biases, subconscious stereotypes may still influence the ways
judges, jurors, and arbitrators assess litigant situations. It should thus be
clear that adjudication is not clearly preferable to ADR procedures for
minority group members and women.
